Hi! My name is Daniel and I'm an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam.
I'm a microeconomic theorist interested mainly in the fields of information economics, behavioral economics and political economics.
Abstract: Consumer data can be used to sort consumers into different market segments, allowing a monopolist to charge different prices at each segment. We study consumer-optimal segmentations with redistributive concerns, i.e., that prioritize poorer consumers. Such segmentations are efficient but may grant additional profits to the monopolist, compared to consumer-optimal segmentations with no redistributive concerns. We characterize the markets for which this is the case and provide a procedure for constructing optimal segmentations given a strong redistributive motive. For the remaining markets, we show that the optimal segmentation is surprisingly simple: it generates one segment with a discount price and one segment with the same price that would be charged if there were no segmentation.
Abstract: We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is systematically overoptimistic about the most favorable outcomes. We show that wishful thinking can lead to a qualitative shift in the structure of optimal persuasion compared to the Bayesian case, whenever the sender is uncertain about what the receiver perceives as the best-case outcome in his decision problem.
Work in Progress
Text and Subtext
|2020, 2021, 2022
|Graduate Microeconomics II
|Microeconomics: Information, Design and Institutions
|Introduction to Game Theory
|Introduction to Economics
- TA for Graduate Microeconomics II at Sciences Po | 2020, 2021, 2022
- TA for Microeconomics: Information, Design and Institutions | 2021
- Lecturer for Introduction to Game Theory at Sciences Po | 2019
- TA for Introduction to Economics at Sciences Po | 2019