Hi! My name is Daniel and I'm an Assistant Professor of Economics at the
University of Amsterdam.
I'm a microeconomic theorist interested mainly in the fields of
information economics, behavioral economics
and political economics.
I obtained my Ph.D. in Economics from
Sciences Po
in 2023, advised by
Eduardo Perez-Richet.
Working Papers
with Victor Augias
and Alexis Ghersengorin.
R&R at the Journal of the European Economic Association.
Extended abstract,
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24).
Abstract.
We study how to optimally segment a monopolistic market given a redistributive objective.
Optimal redistributive segmentations (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., richer
consumers pay higher prices than poorer ones, and (ii) may require giving a higher profit than
uniform pricing if the redistributive motive is strong. We further show that optimal redistributive
segmentations are implementable via price-based regulation.
with Victor Augias.
Abstract.
We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a
non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about
his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is systematically overoptimistic about the most favorable
outcomes. We show that wishful thinking can lead to a qualitative shift in the structure of optimal
persuasion compared to the Bayesian case, whenever the sender is uncertain about what the receiver
perceives as the best-case outcome in his decision problem.